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Losing the Union Man 
Class and Gender in the Postwar Labor Movement 
Christopher Gerteis 
During the early decades of the postwar era, public and private institutions 
constructed social roles for blue-collar men that augured the reemergence of a 
common set of gender practices legitimizing the subordination of women to men and 
the dominance of some men over others. The resultant hegemonic masculine ideal 
for the blue-collar ―working man‖ was nonetheless ideologically flexible: labor 
leaders found it useful as a means of mobilizing union militancy, corporate managers 
were able to deploy it to quell union militancy, and the state found it a useful symbol 
of Japan‘s economic success. By the mid-1960s, work had become the measure of 
citizenship, employment synonymous with manhood, and Japanese men the 
breadwinners of postwar society. 
Higher wages overall also led to a significant change in workers‘ aspirations, 
and by the 1970s blue-collar workers increasingly dreamed of living a middle-class 
lifestyle. This chapter examines two aspects of this historical trajectory. First, it 
argues that higher wages had the unintended consequence of enabling working-class 
men of all ages to identify with middle-class notions of masculinity, from older men 
who wanted to buy cars to young men who wanted to go skiing. Second, it shows 
how a generational schism also developed within the rank and file as younger men 
increasingly rejected the union‘s hegemonic masculine ―family man‖ norm while 
expressing bitterness that their wages did not allow them to access the familial and 
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consumer trappings of middle-class life available to their older male co-workers. 
Some even found new outlets for militant activism, forming interclass relationships 
along generational lines by affiliating with their middle-class contemporaries rather 
than toeing the union line defined by their working-class elders. 
This chapter narrates the generational contest to define working-class 
masculine identity that emerged during the era of global youth culture and radical 
political movements that characterized the 1960s and early 1970s. By analyzing the 
ways in which middle-aged male leaders of Japan‘s Old Left unions perceived 
politically active, young blue-collar men, the chapter shows how generational 
conflict influenced the ways in which an increasing number of blue-collar men of all 
ages identified with middle-class cultural and economic forms. One result was the 
fracturing of the Old Left‘s monopoly on class-based ideals of masculinity, which set 
the stage for a cascade of class and gender confusions that have shaped popular 
notions of ―work‖ and ―manhood‖ to the present day. 
James Roberson and Nobue Suzuki‘s Men and Masculinities in 
Contemporary Japan broke new ground by staking out a field of diverse masculine 
ideals performed by blue- and white-collar workers previously dominated by the 
idea of a hegemonic salaryman persona.1 Tom Gill‘s chapter in this volume 
transgresses the bounds of customary notions of work, workplace, and home by 
exploring the self-construction of masculine ideals among homeless men in the 
urban centers of contemporary Japan. This essay moves in a different direction by 
analyzing conflicting masculine ideals expressed by blue-collar workers during the 
first three decades of the postwar era, and the failure of the socialist labor movement 
to establish a well-defined blue-collar masculine ideal. 
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Wage Systems 
The sometimes violent confrontations between labor and management that 
characterized labor relations during the late 1940s and 1950s contributed to the 
creation of a postwar wage system premised on the notion that a blue-collar man 
was the sole breadwinner for his family, and set the stage for the increased standards 
of living that accompanied double-digit economic growth in the 1960s.2 Developing 
alongside similar wage systems for white-collar workers, the blue-collar age- and 
seniority-based wage system can be seen as one cause of the alienation of young 
men that characterized youth culture of the late 1960s, because it left them lesser 
paid, despite individual skill and ability, and hierarchically subordinate to the older 
generation of male workers. 
The socialist labor movement, which represented the majority of wage-
earning men and women until the late 1980s, was no stranger to the use of gender 
norms as a means of mobilizing the working class. Labor propaganda had deployed 
gendered tropes since the early twentieth century, but the material basis for the 
postwar labor movement‘s reconstruction of customary gender roles fully emerged 
in the early 1950s. The Densan Wage System, named for the Electrical Utility 
Workers‘ Union (Nihon Denki Sangyō Rōdō Kumiai Rengō Kyōgikai, or Densan), 
which created it in the late 1940s,  quickly became the basis upon which the socialist 
General Council of Trade Unions (Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōhyōgikai, or Sōhyō), a 
national federation of unions representing approximately six million wage earners, 
assessed target wages for the pattern bargaining campaigns in the 1950s, which 
consisted of contract negations between an industry-wide union and one employer 
during which the union focused all its resources on winning a favorable contract 
from that employer and then used the conflict and resultant agreement as a precedent 
to demand similar contracts from additional employers not otherwise bound by the 
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original agreement. By the early 1950s, Densan had won several contracts that 
assessed worker wages based on the real cost of living as calculated by the union, 
not the government or management.3 
A radical reconceptualization of the purpose of the workplace itself, the 
Densan Wage System ignored corporate profit (not a particularly pressing issue for a 
publicly owned utility) and privileged need by emphasizing that the purpose of work 
was to enable a worker to live the minimum cultured life guaranteed by Article 25 of 
the 1947 Constitution of Japan.4 The Densan ―market-basket‖ wage system 
established base wages based on the actual cost of food staples, housing, 
transportation, and medical care. Created to suit the needs of a majority male 
workforce, it was built on the premise that a male wage earner headed each worker 
household. By adopting the Densan market-basket ideal, Sōhyō promoted the 
demand for a family-centered wage for all Sōhyō workers. This resulted in a 
federation-wide wage system that privileged the male breadwinner  as the economic 
goal central to union activism.5 
In the mid-1950s, Sōhyō secretary-general Ōta Kaoru institutionalized the 
market-basket system by incorporating its premise that a workers‘ wages supported a 
wife and children at home into the way Sōhyō determined the base wage demanded 
during the annual Spring Wage Offensive (Shuntō). The Shuntō were jointly 
coordinated campaigns in which public and private sector unions collaborated in a 
series of direct actions in support of large-scale pattern bargaining for minimum 
increases in base wages. Both private and public railway unions played a central role 
in the success of the Shuntō because their ability to shut down the transportation 
nexus on command was crucial to Sōhyō‘s ability to engage in pattern bargaining 
with public and private officials. The Spring Wage Offensive provided a powerful, 
coordinated structure within which both private and public sector unions could 
ensure incremental wage increases during the high-speed double-digit growth of the 
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1960s, and it consequently dominated the collective bargaining arena until the late 
1990s.6 
With the launch of the first nationally coordinated Shuntō in 1956, the 
concept of a family wage gained hold through the federation‘s demand for base 
wages determined by the needs of a male worker‘s family implicit in the market-
basket wage demanded by Densan in the early 1950s. At the heart of this system lay 
the fundamental assumption that women‘s wage-earning work merely supplemented 
the income of the male wage earner who presumably headed the Japanese 
household. What motivated workers belonging to Sōhyō-affiliated unions to join 
strikes coordinated by Sōhyō, even when their own unions had already reached a 
settlement with management, was the dream of a base wage that allowed a working 
man to support his family.7 
Nationally coordinated strike actions to win contracts granting aggregate 
base-percentage increases in workers‘ wages worked. Aggregate hourly wages 
nearly doubled for all wage earners between 1955 and 1965. However, wage gains 
were not distributed equally. Women certainly bore the worst of this burden in the 
form of lower wages overall, but the wage gap between male blue-collar workers 
aged 20–24 and 30–34 also widened to 38 percent.8 Later, the wage gap between 
male workers aged 20–24 and 30–34 narrowed to 34 percent from 1965 to 1975, 
while the wage gap for the cohort of men who were 30–34 years in 1975 (and in 
their early twenties in 1965) and men of the age cohort ten years older (40–44 years) 
also narrowed slightly to 12 percent, indicating a general flattening of age-based 
wage disparities that appeared to bode well for the wage-earning prospects of blue-
collar men belonging to younger age cohorts. Although younger men still made two-
thirds of that earned by older male co-workers, the difference was not as great as it 
had been just ten years previous.9 
Blue-collar men were doing well, and union leaders heavily invested in 
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schemes promoting social roles for blue-collar men that defined manliness in terms 
of work and wages as a means encouraging their own political agenda. Social 
expectations that a ―real man‖ worked for his family increasingly became the norm. 
Yet many young men had reported to union officials a decade earlier their dismay 
that even by the age of thirty they did not make enough to marry, a predicament that 
threatened to become a self-perpetuating cycle—a man could not make enough to 
get married, but he would not be paid a high wage until he married.10 Indeed, in 
addition to a wife, higher wages would also allow the acquisition of a host of 
consumer products recently arrived on the national scene, and in the minds of many 
blue-collar men the achievement of manhood had become tantamount to joining the 
middle class. Despite the narrowing of wage disparities between younger and older 
men, the rhetorical and material reality appear to have combined to create a wage 
and status hierarchy that subordinated male blue-collar youth. 
Labor economist Ōmachi Keisuke thought that there was trouble brewing for 
the near future. Writing for the labor magazine Monthly Sōhyō in 1964, Ōmachi 
observed that the wage disparity between men in their twenties and men in their 
thirties (young and middle-aged) played a significant role in the ―graying‖ of the 
labor movement. The majority of workers in the rapidly growing communications, 
transportation, and service sectors were aged twenty-five to thirty, but the average 
age of union members in those same sectors would soon reach thirty-five. Ōmachi 
argued that although workers under the age of thirty comprised more than half of the 
workforce, the rapid economic growth experienced during the preceding decade had 
facilitated a significant wage disparity between young and middle-aged men that 
was far worse in Japan than in Western Europe or the United States. Ōmachi warned 
of dire consequences for Sōhyō if the trend went unaddressed for much longer.11 
Ōmachi‘s article pinpointed a problem that Sōhyō leaders preferred to 
ignore. Sōhyō unions had won contracts that secured better wages and faster 
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promotion tracking for men in exchange for management schemes that, regardless of 
skill or ability, systemically relegated women and young men to the lower-paying 
base of the workforce. Sōhyō unions had agreed to contracts paying younger men 
and women less as a means of defraying the cost of higher wages for middle-aged 
men. Young workers, both males and females under the age of thirty, comprised a 
significantly larger percentage of the waged workforce than unions had on their 
membership roles. While the low rates of unionization among young workers 
resulted from a variety of causes, Ōmachi argued that the significant part of the 
problem lay with the wage disparity between younger and middle-aged men that 
underpinned the family wage model advocated by Sōhyō since the mid-1950s. 
While union leaders did not at first agree with Ōmachi‘s assessment that the 
―graying‖ of union membership was an economic problem, the Sōhyō Youth 
Department nonetheless began to call for improved wages for younger workers, 
which seemed to result in a slight narrowing of the wage differential between 
younger and older men. That the average age of Sōhyō members continued to rise 
(reaching thirty-three in 1970) suggests that despite a narrowed pay differential, 
Sōhyō unions continued to have a difficult time recruiting young members. Wage 
and union membership data offer only a glimpse of the economic basis of worker 
mentality, but it seems likely that the declining numbers of young blue-collar union 
members was in part the result of an emerging generational rift between blue-collar 
men. 
Youth in Question 
The nexus of gender and generation played a significant role in the way Sōhyō 
unions defined union militancy throughout the postwar period. In fact, the postwar 
period has been as much about conflicts of masculinities between men of different 
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generations as about conflicts between men and women. The older generation of 
union leaders had come of age during the years immediately following World War II 
and embodied a manhood whose driving force was twofold: an interest in wages and 
a commitment to the political cause of the socialist party. While union propaganda 
of the 1950s and 1960s was constructed to mobilize union members for both 
political and economic agendas, union leaders understood worker militancy to be 
part and parcel of the union‘s ability to garner better wages for its membership.12 
The experience of war and defeat deeply influenced their political consciousness, 
and the economic desperation of the immediate postwar years combined with the 
conservative retrenchment that accompanied the onset of the cold war in Japan had 
precipitated their political radicalization. The younger generation increasingly 
rebelled not only against their fathers‘ generation but also against the ideal-type 
masculinity their fathers promoted. 
During the 1950s, union leaders dreamed up ways in which union members 
could organize the ideal union family. ―Family union‖ (kazoku kumiai or katei 
kumiai) literature promoted marriage between young union members. One 1950s 
issue of the monthly labor magazine Railway Culture even encouraged young 
railway men and women to marry and raise ―union families‖ by reprinting love 
letters sent to the magazine by young ―union couples‖ (kumiai kappuru) who had 
had a ―workplace wedding‖ (shokuba kekkonshiki). The magazine even went so far 
as to publish sample guest lists and wedding itineraries as templates for young union 
women to use as models for their own ―union weddings.‖13 
Many rank-and-file women who were loyal to the union, but unhappy with 
their secondary status within it, declared their opposition to becoming ―union wives‖ 
within the pages of the same union magazines. When asked by organizers of a union 
roundtable, published by Railway Culture in 1956, whether she desired to marry a 
union man, twenty-two-year-old Kokurō member Kondō Masako replied that all she 
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really wanted was fifteen thousand yen per month, which she was not going to see 
on her monthly pay stub if she married a union man. Despite many similar criticisms 
leveled by rank-and-file union women, Sōhyō and its member unions fashioned their 
national magazines into a forum aimed to persuade their female members to get 
behind the union‘s attempt to build a more family-oriented labor movement by 
supporting their male co-workers (and presumed future husbands) in their fight to 
win better wages.14 
While the notions of marriage and child rearing appeared to have motivated 
the hard-working ―soot-covered fathers‖ (makkuro papa) who had founded the 
railway workers‘ union in the mid-1940s, the ―family union‖ trope no longer 
appealed to the generation of blue-collar men born after the war. Too young to 
remember the labor militancy that had won their unprecedented standard of living, 
Japan‘s generation of the 1960s had grown discontented with the political and 
cultural status quo and sought to destabilize the political establishment through 
cultural, intellectual, and even performative interventions such as experimental film, 
art installations, and theater productions.15 Like their contemporaries in Europe and 
the United States, young men and women in Japan joined interrelated cultural and 
political movements at odds with institutions they perceived to be dominated by a 
petite bourgeoisie in league with a capitalist regime indifferently opposed by stolidly 
authoritarian socialist and communist movements.16 
The countercultural and radical politics at the center of the youth movement 
during the mid- and late 1960s also had a significant impact on the labor movement. 
The growing unpopularity of the Vietnam War led Sōhyō secretary-general Ōta 
Kaoru to believe that the antiwar movement might provide the means to bring young 
workers back into the fold.17 Despite Ōmachi Keisuke‘s warning about the potential 
consequences of Japan‘s age- and seniority-based wage system, Ōta blamed the 
divisive politics of the youth culture made popular by the radical student movement 
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of the era, which he considered undisciplined and dominated by bourgeois students, 
for diverting young workers away from the labor movement‘s class-based political 
and economic agenda. Blaming the popularity of the so-called counterculture for a 
dearth of young people on union membership roles, in 1965 Ōta authorized Sōhyō to 
jointly fund, with the youth action group of the Japan Socialist Party (Shaseidō), the 
creation of the Antiwar Youth Committee (Hansen Seinen Iinkai, or Hansen). Ōta 
believed that Hansen could become the means to reengage blue-collar youth by 
offering them an authorized alternative to the student movement.18 
By embracing the anti-hierarchical, anti-authoritarian ideals espoused by the 
radical student movement, many Hansen chapters came into direct conflict with the 
Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Sōhyō.19 Having replaced Ōta as the head of Sōhyō 
in 1966, Horii Toshikatsu was frustrated by the trajectory Hansen had taken and 
expressed skepticism about the potential for future youth outreach programs. In 
1967, Hansen broke with the JSP altogether, condemning the party for its 
authoritarian hierarchy and rigid doctrine. Ōta, who remained influential in the labor 
movement until his death in 1997, believed that ―bourgeois radicals‖ had taken 
control of what was supposed to be a young worker‘s organization.20 
Although Hansen did not break outright with Sōhyō, internal Sōhyō 
documents show that by 1968 the federation had little influence over the 
organization. Violent confrontations with police at Haneda Airport in October 1967, 
precipitated by radical student groups in collaboration with Hansen, further 
estranged Hansen and Sōhyō leadership. As a result, the Sōhyō Central Committee 
sponsored two directives, published as essays authored by the Sōhyō Youth 
Committee (none of whose members were under the age of thirty), which harshly 
criticized Hansen leadership for breaking away from the JSP and drawing too close 
to the radical student movement.21 Condemned by the JSP, and in serious trouble 
with Sōhyō, the coalition of Hansen chapters declared the ―Old Left‖ incapable of 
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meeting the members‘ core demand for the right to determine their own political 
subjectivity.22 
While Hansen had provided several thousand blue-collar men with an 
alternative forum for political activism, Sōhyō‘s attempt to harness the radical youth 
movement had failed. Indeed, the heads of several Young Workers‘ Departments of 
Sōhyō-affiliated unions had publicly argued in 1968 that young workers were likely 
to be further alienated unless the federation did a better job of adapting the labor 
movement to provide higher base wages and rapid promotion tracking. Charged with 
the responsibility of bringing young workers back into the fold of Sōhyō-led labor 
activism, Sōhyō representatives simply touted the federation line by asserting that 
young workers had a duty to devote themselves to the Spring Wage Offensive—and 
thus demonstrated that Sōhyō was still unable to adapt to accommodate the interests 
of a new generation of blue-collar workers.23 
Perhaps most striking is that Sōhyō publications never presented young men 
in social roles that diverged from union orthodoxy. Throughout the radical 1960s, 
even as Sōhyō was funding Hansen‘s foray into radical youth politics, the labor 
press continued to deploy the trope of the ―family man as union man‖ in its effort to 
stir up rank-and-file support. The paucity of young men‘s voices in Sōhyō 
publications and the lack of younger visions of socialist unionized manhood also 
underscores the issue: by failing to resolve the ―youth question,‖ Sōhyō and its 
member unions lost the struggle over blue-collar masculinity. Indeed, labor 
propaganda after 1965 offers next to no essays, poetry, or political cartooning 
credited as having been produced by men under the age of thirty. By the mid-1970s, 
union leaders stood at the head of an organization of middle-aged men unable to 
persuade their sons to engage with the unions they had founded. This generational 
divide marked a divergence in notions of masculine ideals to which the postwar 
labor movement seemed unable to adapt, and young workers appear to have been 
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lost to the labor unions that sought to mobilize them. 
Dreaming to be Middle-Class 
In the economically troubled years following the OPEC oil embargo of 1973–74, 
Sōhyō leaders were primarily concerned with stemming the impact of rising 
consumer prices and stagnant wages and no longer even tried to develop outreach 
programs for younger workers interested in alternative political and cultural modes 
of expression. Well before the radical youth movement began to wind down in the 
early 1970s, Sōhyō cut off funds for organizing young workers outside mainstream 
union halls. Union leaders also began to use the labor press to attempt to co-opt 
emerging middle-class expectations among the rank and file by providing a forum 
for them to explore their aspirations and reinvent what it meant to be a union man.  
Nowhere was this reinvention of the union man more apparent than in the 
political cartoons included in the January 1975 issue of Kokurō Bunka. Selected by 
magazine editors for the 1975 New Year‘s special issue, two political cartoons by 
Suzuki Akuzō, an employee of the Japan National Railways at the Ōmiya Workshop, 
represent the growing generational tension within Sōhyō‘s flagship union.24 
Suzuki‘s cartoon (see figure 6.1) opened the segment with the ubiquitous depiction 
of the union man as a family man.25 Central to this panel is a brief exchange 
between two young male children. Exclaims one to the other, ―Only father and the 
postman work on New Year‘s!‖ The male railway worker the young boys are talking 
about, the ticket puncher to the right of the frame, who presumably is also the father 
of the cheeky child, swings his head around with a surprised look on his face. The 
motive for his surprise is unclear, but the truth of the matter probably hit home with 
the intended audience of railway workers who had also likely worked more than one 
national holiday. Only he and the postal worker are forced to work on the most 
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important family holiday of the year. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1「 ゛国鉄のる。。。゛、鈴木安久三、「国労文化」１９７５。１、 ６７。」 
 
Suzuki‘s cartooning relied on the ―family man as union man‖ trope, common 
in labor‘s political cartooning (manga) since the 1950s, to connect with his intended 
audience. However, the panel featured in figure 6.1 also depicts a growing 
undercurrent of resentment within the railway workforce by providing the intended 
reader the opportunity to explore its displeasure that management and union had 
agreed to longer work hours in exchange for higher monthly wages. By the early 
1970s transportation workers were averaging 35 percent more hours per month than 
they had worked a decade earlier, and, although the hours were for the most part 
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evenly distributed between age groups, wages were not.26 Indeed, Kumazawa 
Makoto argued that the national trend was the result of a tacit agreement between 
union leadership and management to seek ways to improve worker productivity, by 
and large through longer work hours, in trade for higher aggregate monthly wages. 
While this was an overt process in many of the industrial unions outside Sōhyō, 
productivity arrangements also accounted for a measurable percentage of the annual-
base wage increases won by Sōhyō member unions since the early 1960s.27  
Suzuki Akuzō‘s cartoon depicted in figure 6.2, also included in the January 
1975 issue of Railway Culture, offers additional insight into the rank-and-file 
consciousness of Kokurō workers of the mid-1970s by illustrating an image of union 
roles for men and women that demonstrate how middle-aged men had failed to adapt 
to the changing interests of young workers. Entitled ―New Year‘s Temple Visit,‖ the 
panel was published as part of the occasional series ―JNR Manga Collective,‖ which 
magazine editors used to groom artists thought to show potential to become regular 
contributors. A panel divided into eight frames, Suzuki‘s vignette depicts a small 
group of union men out visiting on New Year‘s Day.  
‗Losing the Union Man‘ in Recreating Japanese Men  202 
 
 
Figure 6.2「 レンサイ国鉄マンガ焦団、゛新春のカミ詣゛、鈴木安久三、「国労文
化」    １９７５。１、７３。 」 
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In the first frame, the men step into the entryway of the home (genkan) of the 
chief of their local union chapter while calling out their New Year‘s wishes to the 
union leader‘s wife. She greets them in the entryway but is surprised that they and 
even her husband have come to visit her. The men explain that their union secretary 
had almost been disinherited by his family because of the amount of time required 
by his union duties, but once his wife had realized what the family was up to she 
was able to convince them to back down by explaining that without the union he and 
his family would have nothing. In gratitude for her intervention, the union leaders 
elected to visit all their wives in order to convey their New Year‘s wishes. ―We have 
resolved that at the start of the New Year we should visit the wives [kami-san, which 
is a homonym for both ―wife‖ and the ―god‖ of a shrine] of our union members 
instead of shrines and temples.‖ ―Mother,‖ the woman‘s husband and union chief 
announces, ―the Shuntō is coming soon; we would be grateful for your support.‖ 
The cartoon, meant as a reminder of normative gender roles for women and 
men, echoes prescribed roles for men by reinforcing the supportive role that married 
women were expected to play in union affairs. It illustrates a union orthodoxy that 
precluded the emergence of social roles at odds with gender norms established in the 
1950s. While such kinds of social roles continued to appeal to men over the age of 
thirty-five, every year after 1960 fewer men under the age of thirty joined Sōhyō-
affiliated unions, which suggests that the institutional culture of Sōhyō did not 
appeal to the majority of young blue-collar workers, male or female. The issue 
seemed to be changing notions of personal self-identification. 
Making more money than ever before, blue-collar men, young and old, 
increasingly imagined themselves to be middle-class. Importantly, the January 1975 
issue of Railway Culture also marks an increased interest in the trappings of middle-
class life expressed by union leaders and rank-and-file members. Since the late 
1940s, editors had featured works of fiction and prose submitted to the magazine by 
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union workers.28 Most submissions were selected to reflect the theme of a particular 
issue, and it should come as no surprise that the majority expressed the positive 
impact union activism played in the life of Japanese workers. Shinagawa-based 
passenger car attendant Yamada Akihiko‘s ―The Union Badge‖ explored the pride 
felt by those men who earn a railway union pin (merit badge) through dedication and 
hard work for union causes. Stolid in its adherence to the ―union line,‖ Yamada‘s 
essay is a classic example of the literary productions preferred by union leadership 
and also accurately reflects the purpose of the magazine—to provide a regular forum 
for pro-labor propaganda.29 
Despite the general emphasis on union-authorized propaganda, labor 
magazines allowed other perspectives as well. One essay by Okayama Station 
attendant Onimaru Hiroyuki introduced a new form of rank-and-file expression—the 
travel essay. Onimaru explored the historic sights and sounds of rural rail travel in 
and around the city of Kyoto, romantically intertwining modern rail travel with an 
ancient landscape.30 Onimaru‘s dreamlike journey illustrates an emerging desire 
among blue- and white-collar workers for more leisure time, further developed in a 
short essay submitted by Railway Credit Union clerk Ōki Kiyoshi. Ōki‘s ―Ski Area 
of the Future‖ narrates his personal dream of skiing mountain slopes like the 
Olympic athletes he and millions of Japanese had watched during the televised 
Winter Olympic Games hosted by the northern city of Sapporo in 1972, during 
which Kasaya Yukio and two other Japanese nationals swept the top three places in 
the ski jump event.31 While sports and leisure travel were common tropes for 
establishing a masculine ideal in the socialist lexicon of Western and northern 
Europe, skiing requires expensive gear—skis, boots, poles—not customarily owned 
by blue-collar Japanese men. The essays by Ōki and Onimaru are not simply stolid 
nods to socialist ideals; they illustrate the emergence of a middle-class consumer 
consciousness among male blue-collar workers who wanted to enjoy the increased 
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standards of living possible only since the mid-1960s. Writing in the mid-1970s, and 
in their early thirties, Ōki and Onimaru both expressed their dream of middle-class 
life outside the union-authorized trope of the ―working man as family man.‖ 
While the leaders of Sōhyō unions were still deeply invested in constructing 
a socialist subjectivity for Japan‘s working class, by the mid-1970s the ―railway 
man‖ greatly differed from the makkuro papa, the soot-covered craftsman who 
founded the union in the mid-1940s. He still dreamt of providing for his family, but 
he also wanted leisure time to spend on his own pursuits such as travel, sports, and 
perhaps owning his own automobile. The railway man of 1975 did not dream of 
class liberation, he dreamt of being middle-class, and the question that plagued 
Sōhyō leaders for the remainder of the decade was whether there was a role for 
socialist unions in a middle-class society. 
The cover story of the January 1975 issue of Railway Culture provides 
evidence that influential members of the inner circles of Sōhyō were increasingly 
ambivalent toward, if not confused about, the impact that the changing class identity 
of blue-collar workers might have on the future of the labor movement. In ―The 
Struggle with Inflation,‖ Kokurō Central Committee chairman Sakai Ichizō and 
labor economist Kamakura Takao examine the extent to which the double-digit 
inflation that followed the 1973 ―oil shock‖ threatened to erode the hard-won wage 
gains of the 1960s.32 Interestingly, Sakai and Kamakura dedicate a significant 
portion of their jointly written essay to discussing the rapidly increasing cost of 
gasoline. Given that they were writing for an audience of unionized railway workers, 
the authors could easily have crafted their comments as an admonishment against 
overreliance on private automobiles. Instead, they offered reassurances that gas 
prices might yet stabilize enough to allow car travel to become affordable for most 
railway workers and their families. Automobile ownership, the first of the ―three 
C‘s‖ (car, cooler, and color TV), was the primary consumer symbol of the middle 
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class.33 That Sakai and Kamakura felt compelled to offer an optimistic assessment 
of the chances that blue-collar workers like those of the Japan National Railways 
(JNR) could soon afford to drive their own automobile is a good indicator of the 
increasing cultural significance that blue-collar workers assigned to the material 
goods associated with middle-class life. But in embracing the dream of affluence, 
labor leaders somehow failed also to persuade Japan‘s blue-collar workers of the 
continued importance of union militancy in securing the wages that paid for it all.34 
 
During the first three decades of the postwar era, leaders of Japan‘s socialist unions 
deployed notions of the ―family man as bread winner‖ predicated on economic and 
cultural systems that relegated younger men and women of all ages to the lower tiers 
of a wage economy that privileged older family men. During the peak economic 
boom years of the 1960s, some six million workers belonged to unions affiliated 
with Sōhyō, making it appear that the gendered and class-based notion of the 
―family man‖ portrayed by socialist unions in the 1960s and 1970s appealed to 
middle-aged male union members and their families. However, the notion of the 
―union man as family man‖ did not have the same appeal to the young blue-collar 
men who came of age amid the countercultural and political movements of the 
1960s. It did not benefit them much either. 
The postwar wage system that excluded wage-earning women and 
disadvantaged young men was nonetheless responsible for an unprecedented 
improvement in the economic status of nearly all Japanese. Contemporary writings 
about Japan report that the vast majority of Japanese consider themselves to be 
―middle-class.‖ Japan‘s labor unions played a significant role in the process of 
winning the wages that enabled this self-perception, but becoming middle-class also 
had serious consequences for the militant unions that spearheaded the wage 
struggles of the postwar period. By elevating blue-collar Japanese into the middle 
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class, their economic success may have undone their own organizing base. 
Sōhyō‘s flagship union, Kokurō, was disemboweled by the privatization of 
JNR during the late 1980s, which encouraged managers and government bureaucrats 
nationwide to redouble propaganda campaigns promoting a company-centered 
workforce. Perhaps in the face of a weakened labor movement, but also because of 
their gendered understanding of a changed economic status, men working blue-
collar jobs represented by the militant unions that had defined the early postwar era 
increasingly thought of themselves as company, not union, men. 
The ―graying‖ of Sōhyō and its member unions continued until its 
dissolution in 1989, and while the socialist agenda of many labor unions did not die 
with the federation, its successor Rengo (Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōrengōkai) was 
never able to garner the organizational strength needed to stop, or even slow, the 
layoffs and wage cuts that characterized the 1990s. When the economic 
retrenchment in the post-bubble economy of the early 1990s led to the first mass 
layoffs since the early 1950s, Japan‘s labor unions were too weak to fulfill their 
fiduciary duty to resist the worst effects of downsizing. Hundreds of thousands of 
blue-collar men lost their jobs, contributing to what politicians and business leaders 
would later refer to as a national crisis of masculinity. While union membership was 
not a prerequisite to being a blue-collar man, the wages won by Japan‘s postwar 
labor movement were, and the dissolution of Sōhyō was the closing chapter to the 
era of union militancy that had won the wages at the root of the postwar masculine 
ideal. In many ways losing the union man also meant losing the economic basis of 
blue-collar manhood in postwar Japan.  
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Notes 
I wish to thank the Japan–United States Education Commission and the AAS 
Northeast Asia Council (NEAC) for generously funding the field and archival 
research that made this article possible. 
35. Gordon Matthews, ―Can a ‗Real Man‘ Live for His Family: Ikigai and 
Masculinity in Today‘s Japan,‖ James Roberson, ―Japanese Working-Class 
Masculinities: Marginalizing Complicities,‖ Tom Gill, ―When Pillars 
Evaporate: Structuring Masculinity at the Japanese Margins,‖ and Masaki 
Ishii-Kuntz, ―Balancing Fatherhood and Work: Experience of Diverse 
Masculinities in Contemporary Japan,‖ all in Roberson and Suzuki 2003, pp. 
109–25; 126–43; 144–61; and 198–216. 
36. Kumazawa 1996, p. 52; and Gordon 1998, pp. 163–68. 
37. Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōhyōgikai 1964, pp. 362–73. 
38. The 1947 Constitution of Japan, available online at 
http://history.hanover.edu/texts/1947con.html (accessed 20 June 2008). 
39. Women were not presumed to head a household, and job categories 
customarily held by women were subsequently excluded in the contracts that 
resulted from the pattern bargaining campaigns of the early and mid-1950s. 
See Gerteis 2009, pp. 82–85. 
40. Kume 1998, pp. 73–106; and Weathers 2008, pp. 177–97. 
41. Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōhyōgikai 1964, pp. 362–73; and Tōkyō Chihō Rōdō 
Kumiai Hyōgikai 1980, pp. 491–511. 
42. Ōmachi 1964, pp. 65–73; and Nihon Tōkei Kyōkai 1975, pp. 398–99.  
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43. Men aged 20–24 holding manufacturing jobs earned 68 percent of the wages 
earned by men aged 30–34, while transportation and communication sector 
workers earned 71 percent. Male utility workers aged 20–24 earned 64 
percent, and male service sector workers, which included government 
employees and teachers, 65 percent. Nihon Tōkei Kyōkai 1975, pp. 70–75, 
398–99. 
44. Gerteis 2009, pp. 129–30. 
45. Ōmachi 1964, pp. 65–73.  
46. Gibbs 2000; Kume 1998; and Carlile 2005. 
47. Kokutetsu Rōdō Kumiai Seinenkyōiku 1956, pp. 26–28, 30–34. See Gerteis 
2009, pp. 122–58. 
48. Gerteis 2009, pp. 128–29, 122–58. 
49. Marotti 2006, pp. 606–18. 
50. [STET]Takami[STET] 1968. 
51. Havens 1987; Takagi 1985; and ―Hansen, 1965.7–1969.5,‖ in the papers of 
Sōhyō Organizing Department, Ōhara Institute for Social Research, Hōsei 
University. 
52. ‖Hansen, 1965.7–1969.5,‖ in the papers of Sōhyō Organizing Department, 
Ōhara Institute for Social Research, Hōsei University. 
53. Takami 1968, pp. 132–84. 
54. From notes filed in the folder labeled ―Hansen, 1965.7–1969.5,‖ in the 
papers of Sōhyō Organizing Department, Ōhara Institute for Social Research, 
Hōsei University; and Mizuno 2002. 
55. Sōhyō Seitai Iinkai 1968, pp. 18–27; and Enda 1968, pp. 28–38.  
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56. Takami 1968, pp. 132–84. 
57. Sōhyō Seinenbu 1968, pp. 39–71. 
58. The Ōmiya facility, which serviced rolling stock for half a dozen major 
railway lines, was, despite appearances, the heart of Kokurō‘s cultural and 
political enterprises intended to promote concepts and ideals thought to help 
build a socialist consciousness among rank-and-file workers. Wes Sasaki-
Uemura more fully explores how the hard-working [STET]makkuro[STET] 
papa (soot-covered fathers) of a similar JNR workshop in the 1950s 
composed their poetical expressions of work, life, and union. Sasaki-Uemura 
2001, pp. 81–111.  
59. The magazine does not tell us the actual work that Suzuki did at the Ōmiya 
Workshop.  
60. Nihon Tōkei Kyōkai 1949–, 1975 edition, p. 71. 
61. Kumazawa 1996, pp. 125–58. 
62. Like their prewar predecessors, Japan‘s postwar unions were also in close 
collaboration with sympathetic artists and intellectuals to create what they 
hoped would become the basis of a socialist national culture for Japan. 
Shinoda 2005a, pp. 1–16; Shinoda 2005b, pp. 13–31; and Kokumin Bunka 
Kaigi 1995, pp. 3–15. 
63. Yamada 1975, pp. 3–4. 
64. Onimaru 1975, pp. 2–3. 
65. Kasaya‘s gold medal was the first won by a Japanese national. Ōki 1975, pp. 
4–5; and 
www.olympic.org/uk/games/past/index_uk.asp?OLGT=2&OLGY=1972 
(accessed 18 June 2008). 
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66. Kamakura and Sakai 1975, pp. 8–19. The railway workers‘ union Kokurō 
was far weaker than it had been at the start of the postwar period. In part 
precipitated by the rise of the trucking industry, conservative factions in 
government and management initiatives to break the union had for all intents 
and purposes ended the railway union‘s primary means of wielding political 
power—the ability to control the nation‘s primary transportations modes—
and split the railway workplace into three distinct bargaining units. Weathers 
1994, pp. 621–33. 
67. See Partner 1999, pp. 44–106. 
68. Kamakura and Sakai 1975, pp. 8–19. 
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